Agency Without Metaphysical Freedom: A Case for a Post-Free Will Conception of Responsibility
Introduction
The phenomenology of human choice presents a compelling, if ultimately misleading, case for what philosophers term libertarian free will. The subjective experience of deliberation, of weighing reasons and selecting a course of action, seems to imply that, in any given instance, one “could have done otherwise.” This notion of contra-causal freedom—the idea that the agent acts as an uncaused cause or a “prime mover unmoved”—is the bedrock upon which traditional conceptions of moral responsibility have been built. It grounds our practices of praise and blame in the belief that individuals are the ultimate originators of their deeds and thus fundamentally deserve reward or punishment.
This paper, however, will argue that this conception of free will is both metaphysically untenable and ethically problematic. Our analysis will proceed in three stages. First, we shall articulate the standard philosophical argument against libertarian free will, demonstrating its logical incoherence irrespective of whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic. Second, we will distinguish this incompatibilist position from a simplistic fatalism, arguing that a robust and meaningful conception of human agency is entirely compatible with a deterministic or naturalistic worldview. Finally, we will advance the normative thesis that abandoning the “illusion” of free will is not a loss to be mourned but a necessary step toward building more rational, humane, and effective systems of justice and social organization.
I. The Metaphysical Incoherence of Libertarian Freedom
The philosophical case against libertarian free will can be framed as a dilemma. The state of the world at any given moment is either entirely the result of prior causes or it is not. Let us consider each horn of this dilemma in turn.
- If a choice is causally determined: If an agent’s decision is the necessary outcome of an unbroken chain of prior causes—including genetic endowment, environmental conditioning, and antecedent brain states—then the agent cannot be its ultimate source. This causal chain regresses to factors far beyond the agent’s control, such as their birth and the initial conditions of the universe. While the agent is a crucial link in this chain, and their deliberation is a real and complex causal process, they are not the originating cause. To claim they could have done otherwise would be to claim that an identical set of antecedent conditions could produce a different effect, which is a violation of the deterministic premise.
- If a choice is uncaused (or indeterministic): To escape the regress of determinism, one might posit that choices are not determined by prior causes. This introduces an element of indeterminism or randomness into the process. However, an event that is fundamentally random is, by definition, not under the control of the agent. If a decision arises from a stochastic quantum event in the brain, for instance, it is no more “authored” by the agent than if it were determined by external forces. It is simply an accident for which the agent cannot be held responsible.
In either scenario, the conditions necessary for libertarian free will—that the agent be the ultimate, conscious author of their actions—fail to obtain. The concept of an agent as a causa sui (a self-caused cause) is logically incoherent. Therefore, the kind of deep, metaphysical freedom that underwrites “basic desert” moral responsibility is an impossibility.
II. Distinguishing Determinism from Fatalism: A Defense of Agency
A common objection to this conclusion is that it reduces human beings to mere automata and entails a dispiriting fatalism. This objection, however, rests on a category error: it conflates determinism with a lack of agency. Agency, properly understood, does not require a breach in the causal nexus. Rather, it refers to the capacity of a complex system to engage in deliberation, to respond to reasons, and to modify its behavior based on new information and goals.
The fact that these cognitive processes are themselves caused does not render them epiphenomenal or irrelevant. A person’s capacity for rational thought, their intentions, and their understanding of consequences are all causally potent features of the world. It matters profoundly whether an action was the result of conscious deliberation or an involuntary spasm, whether the agent was coerced or acting in accordance with their own desires and values. These distinctions are central to our understanding of responsibility, and they remain entirely intact within a naturalistic framework. Our agency is real; it is simply not metaphysical. We are complex systems embedded within the causal fabric of nature, not supernatural entities standing outside of it.
III. The Normative Case Against Free Will: Beyond Retributivism
Clinging to the belief in libertarian free will is not a harmless metaphysical indulgence; it has profound and often deleterious social consequences. Its most significant impact is on our systems of justice, which are frequently animated by a retributivist logic. Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve to suffer in proportion to their moral culpability. This backward-looking justification is predicated entirely on the assumption that the offender, as an ultimate author, could and should have chosen otherwise.
This belief fosters a punitive impulse that prioritizes vengeance over societal well-being. It encourages excessive sentencing and harsh prison conditions, while discouraging inquiry into the complex causal factors underlying criminal behavior—such as poverty, trauma, mental illness, and systemic disadvantage.
By contrast, a worldview that rejects libertarian free will invites a more forward-looking, consequentialist approach to justice. If we view harmful behavior not as the product of an uncaused evil will but as an unfortunate outcome of a complex web of causes, our focus naturally shifts from retribution to prevention, rehabilitation, and harm reduction. Accountability is not abandoned but re-grounded. The purpose of holding an individual responsible for a harmful act is not to mete out their “just deserts,” but to:
- (a) Protect society from further harm.
- (b) Deter future harmful acts (by both the individual and others).
- (c) Facilitate the rehabilitation of the individual where possible.
This model, analogous to a public health approach, allows us to address destructive behavior rationally and compassionately, without recourse to the pre-scientific illusion of uncaused choice.
Conclusion
The abandonment of the concept of libertarian free will does not leave a normative or existential void. Instead, it allows for a more intellectually honest and ethically sophisticated understanding of ourselves. It replaces a metaphysically dubious notion of freedom with a scientifically grounded conception of agency. It encourages us to move beyond a primitive politics of blame and retribution toward the creation of social systems designed with a clear-eyed understanding of the causal determinants of human behavior.
We can still celebrate human achievement, condemn harmful actions, and strive for personal growth. These practices, however, are better served by an appreciation of our profound interconnectedness and the complex histories that shape us. True progress lies not in the insistence that we could have done otherwise in the past, but in the collective effort to create the conditions that will allow us to do better in the future.