From Moral Error to Rational Progress: A Defense of Moral Abolitionism
Abstract:
This paper argues that a commitment to moral anti-realism, specifically in the form of J.L. Mackie’s Error Theory, should lead not to a conservative Fictionalism but to a radical Abolitionism. We first establish the plausibility of Error Theory, buttressed by an Evolutionary Debunking Argument. We then argue that a uniquely pernicious and central function of moral concepts is to license retributive emotions, a function analogous to that of the folk concept of libertarian free will. Consequently, morality is not a “noble lie” worth preserving but a harmful fiction that ought to be eliminated. After addressing key objections concerning motivational collapse and social coordination, the paper concludes by outlining a constructive alternative: an Enlightenment Rationalist project that replaces moral condemnation with a “public health” model of systemic analysis aimed at fostering human well-being.
Keywords: Moral Abolitionism, Moral Error Theory, J.L. Mackie, Evolutionary Debunking Argument, Moral Fictionalism, Hard Incompatibilism, Free Will, Retributivism, Rationalism, Richard Garner.
1. Introduction: The Problem of Objective Morality
The intractable nature of moral disagreement, coupled with the difficulty of grounding objective values within a naturalistic worldview, motivates a deep skepticism about the entire moral enterprise. This leads to a central question: if we conclude that objective, mind-independent moral facts do not exist, what are the practical and theoretical consequences? This paper defends a radical alternative: Moral Abolitionism. We shall argue that the conceptual framework of morality is not only a metaphysical error but a practical impediment to rational and humane problem-solving. This paper will proceed in five parts: defending Moral Error Theory; contrasting Fictionalism and Abolitionism; presenting the positive case for Abolitionism; defending it against pragmatic objections; and sketching its constructive, rationalist replacement.
2. The Foundation: Defending Moral Error Theory
J.L. Mackie’s (1977) Moral Error Theory rests upon two pillars: a Conceptual Claim that our moral language is cognitivist and purports to state objective facts, and an Ontological Claim that the world does not contain such properties. This latter claim is powerfully buttressed by modern Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs), as advanced by thinkers like Sharon Street (2006) and Richard Joyce (2006). The EDA provides a complete causal explanation for our core moral beliefs that is independent of their truth, functioning as an undercutting defeater that severs any epistemic link to putative moral facts. The most parsimonious conclusion is that all positive moral judgments are systematically false.
3. The Pragmatic Dilemma: Fictionalism vs. Abolitionism
Faced with this error, the Fictionalist (Joyce, 2001) argues that morality is a “useful fiction.” Abolitionism, the position defended here and articulated in different forms by thinkers such as Richard Garner (1994) and Michael Ruse (1986), counters that it is a “pernicious fiction.” Among morality’s several functions, a uniquely pernicious and central one is its licensing of retributive emotions. This function is analogous to the folk concept of libertarian free will, which grounds a retributive model of justice. The concept of “objective moral wrongness” does parallel work for our interpersonal stances, marking a perpetrator as a legitimate target for blame and hatred. While other theorists like Jonas Olson (2014) have explored the abolitionist stance, this tight analogy with the free will debate sharpens its critical edge.
4. Defending Abolitionism Against Pragmatic Objections
The abolitionist proposal invites serious pragmatic objections, which we shall now address.
4.1 The Motivational Collapse Objection:
The fictionalist’s core concern is that without morality, motivation for pro-social behavior would collapse into egoism.
Rebuttal: This objection underestimates non-moral motivations like empathy and reciprocity. Abolitionism does not eliminate these dispositions; it reframes their justification from a mysterious categorical imperative to a transparent, instrumental reason. Indeed, there is evidence from behavioral science that transparency about reasons and incentives can sustain pro-social motivation without the need for categorical imperatives, as seen in communities like effective altruism.
4.2 The Coordination Problem Objection:
A second objection is that purely pragmatic reasoning is insufficient to solve large-scale coordination problems, for which moral norms provide simple, powerful heuristics.
Rebuttal: Abolitionism does not reject norms, only moralized norms. Furthermore, an abolitionist framework is not merely equivalent but superior for coordination. Moral norms are rigid and often lead to intractable conflicts. Pragmatic norms, by contrast, are flexible and evidence-based, making them better suited for navigating complex social challenges.
4.3 The Instrumental Drift Objection:
If well-being is the new goal, why should we privilege it? Is this not smuggling a quasi-moral, foundational value back into the system?
Rebuttal: This objection conflates objective value with shared value. The goal of well-being is adopted as a contingent, pragmatic starting point. As Sharon Street (2012) argues, practical reason operates from within an agent’s existing commitments. The insistence on a categorical reason to privilege well-being only makes sense within the moral realist framework we have already rejected; from the abolitionist perspective, this demand is a category error.
5. The Constructive Project: Enlightenment Rationalism
Abolitionism does not lead to a nihilistic void but to a constructive replacement: a shift from a moral framework to a public health and engineering framework.
5.1 Principles and Concrete Applications
This project is guided by principles of instrumental reason, causal diagnosis, and systemic design. Consider its application to addiction and drug policy. The moral framework labels addiction a “moral failing,” justifying a punitive response. A public health framework reconceptualizes it as a medical and social problem, replacing condemnation with causal diagnosis and shifting the response from punishment to treatment and harm reduction. A similar shift could apply to criminal justice: rather than condemning crime as ‘evil,’ abolitionism treats it as the predictable outcome of social and psychological determinants, shifting focus from retribution to prevention and rehabilitation.
5.2 A Conscious Rationalism
This constructive project is grounded in a Rationalist Optimism. This is not a naive faith in reason, but a conscious philosophical choice positioned against both Humean skepticism about reason’s motivational power and a Nietzschean critique of universalist projects. Unlike Nietzsche, however, the abolitionist does not seek to replace morality with a new hierarchy of values or an aesthetic ideal, but with transparent systems of causal analysis and instrumental reasoning. It wagers that transparent reason and better design are ultimately more potent and humane tools for regulating behavior than a noble lie.
6. Conclusion
This paper has argued that Moral Error Theory is the correct metaethical position and that, faced with this error, the Abolitionist path is superior to the Fictionalist one. We have defended this claim against significant pragmatic objections, arguing that the fiction of morality is a pernicious conceptual error that fuels retributive passions and hinders rational problem-solving.
The ultimate goal of Moral Abolitionism is not to destroy value but to reconstruct it on a firmer foundation. Adopting this framework would transform public discourse. A society guided by these principles would see its political debates shift from moralistic crusades to pragmatic discussions of policy effectiveness, its legal system evolve from a theater of retribution to an engine of social diagnostics, and its educational institutions prioritize critical thinking over the indoctrination of any particular moral code. In rejecting the fiction of morality, we do not descend into chaos; we ascend into a world where responsibility, compassion, and reason are consciously chosen rather than imposed by illusion.