Thinking Beyond Intuition.

Abstract: The perennial debate concerning the existence of God has traditionally focused on metaphysical, epistemological, and moral arguments. This paper contends that such debates are premature, as they presuppose the semantic viability of the concept of ‘God’. We advance an argument for a position termed ‘nulltheism’, which holds that the set of individuals who believe […]

This paper argues that traditional ethical systems, predicated on the illusion of free will, are fundamentally incoherent. It first establishes a metaphysical framework of necessitarianism, wherein consciousness is an emergent, observational property of a deterministic universe. From this foundation, it deconstructs concepts such as moral responsibility, blame, and justice as social constructs designed to mitigate the inherent horror of conscious existence. Morality is anesthesia. In place of a prescriptive morality of “good” and “evil,” the paper proposes a descriptive and functional system termed “Anesthetic Ethics.” Within this framework, a “moral” action is not one that aligns with an objective good, but one that sustainably maximizes an individual’s and a community’s capacity to cope with existence. The ultimate measure of any action is its long-term viability as an anesthetic. We conclude by exploring the unsettling but logical implications of this framework, which reframes human morality as the sophisticated pragmatism of an addict seeking to manage their own condition.

I. On the Self We mistake the complexity of our thoughts for freedom, like a river believing it has chosen its path to the sea. Deliberation is the sound the gears make. Choice is theater. The self is not the author, nor even the character. It is the conscious tremor in the puppet’s string, and […]

Pushed onto the stage. A script, a light. The beginning is unrecorded. The performance is mandatory. The applause is silence. The silence is mandatory. A thirst for resolution. A question shaped like a mouth. The cosmos, a stone in the mouth. The stone does not answer. The mouth swallows itself. The work is to adorn […]

This essay presents a philosophical examination of epistemic humility, proposing it not merely as a psychological disposition but as a normative epistemic principle essential for rational inquiry. We begin by furnishing a precise definition of epistemic humility, distinguishing it from radical skepticism and mere intellectual modesty. Subsequently, we ground the principle in a fallibilist conception of knowledge, drawing upon historical shifts in scientific paradigms to illustrate the provisional nature of theoretical frameworks. The analysis then explores the role of interpretation and conceptual schemata in the construction of knowledge, using interpretations of quantum mechanics as a case study to challenge naive realism. Finally, we articulate the normative case against its antithesis, epistemic hubris, identifying its cognitive and ethical costs. We conclude that epistemic humility, understood as a second-order awareness of the limits of our cognitive faculties, is a necessary condition for intellectual progress and integrity.

This paper identifies and analyzes a contemporary modality of the absurd that diverges fundamentally from its classical existentialist conception. Whereas the Camusian absurd arises from a confrontation between the human desire for meaning and a meaningless universe, we posit the emergence of a performative absurd—a strategic deployment of incoherence as a tool for demonstrating power and testing the limits of normative structures. Using a thought experiment involving a grotesquely transgressive cultural artifact, we argue that such spectacles function not as substantive political statements but as ideological stress tests. Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks of Slavoj Žižek and Guy Debord, we contend that within the logic of the spectacle, such performances expose the fragility of social consensus and the capacity of influence to hollow out semantic and moral content. The analysis extends to case studies in political discourse and science denial, concluding that this deployed absurdity serves as a powerful diagnostic tool, revealing the erosion of the symbolic authority that underpins social order.

This paper presents a critical examination of Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), a prominent transcendental argument for the logical necessity of a universal morality. Gewirth contends that from the inescapable fact of purposive agency, any rational agent is dialectically compelled to accept the rights of all other agents to freedom and well-being. We argue that this conclusion, while seemingly rigorous, is ultimately unpersuasive. The PGC’s claim to objectivity rests on two problematic moves: first, it conflates the inescapable nature of agency with an optional commitment to a robust, universalist conception of rationality; and second, it contains an illicit generalization from an agent’s first-person valuation of their own necessary goods to a universal moral valuation of those goods for all agents. By situating these objections within the broader philosophical debate, we conclude that the PGC fails to establish moral realism and, at best, exemplifies a form of Kantian constructivism; a system an agent is not logically compelled to adopt.

This paper presents a systematic critique of moral realism, the metaethical thesis that there exist stance-independent, objective moral facts. While this position holds considerable intuitive and practical appeal—purportedly grounding universal condemnation of harm and underwriting the force of normative claims—we shall argue that it is ultimately untenable upon closer philosophical scrutiny. The argument proceeds along two primary axes of critique. First, we advance an ontological objection, contending that moral realism posits the existence of metaphysically “queer” properties for which there is no coherent account. Second, we present an epistemological objection, arguing that the fact of persistent and fundamental moral disagreement is better explained by an anti-realist thesis than by the realist’s claim of access to objective truths. We conclude that abandoning moral realism does not entail a descent into nihilism or arbitrary relativism; rather, it clears the ground for a more intellectually honest and pragmatically sound constructivist approach to ethics as a human project.

The concept of libertarian free will—the capacity of an agent to make choices uncoerced by the antecedent causal chain—remains a deeply intuitive and foundational assumption in much of our legal, ethical, and social discourse. This essay advances a two-part argument against this conception. First, we contend that libertarian free will is metaphysically incoherent, collapsing under the dilemma of determinism versus indeterminism. Neither a causally determined universe nor one infused with genuine randomness provides the logical space for an agent to be the ultimate, self-caused author of their actions. Second, we present a normative argument that the widespread belief in this form of freedom is not only unnecessary for a robust system of ethics and accountability but is actively detrimental, particularly in its underwriting of retributive theories of justice. We conclude by proposing an alternative framework wherein agency and responsibility are reconceptualized in a manner compatible with naturalism, leading to a more compassionate and effective approach to social policy.